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Abstract

Collaborative intrusion detection system (CIDS), where IDS hosts work with each
other and share resources, have been proposed to cope with the increasingly sophisticated
cyberattacks. Despite the promising benefits such as expanded signature databases and
alert data from multiple sites, trust management and consensus building remain as
challenges for a CIDS to work effectively. The blockchain technology with built-in
immutability and consensus building capability provides a viable solution to the issues of
CIDS. In this paper, we introduce an architecture for a blockchain-enabled signaturebased collaborative IDS, discuss the implementation strategy of the proposed architecture
and developed a prototype using Hyperledger and Snort. Our preliminary evaluation on a
bench mark showed the proposed architecture offers a solution by addressing the issues
of trust, data sharing and insider attacks in the network environment of CIDSs. The
implications and limitations of this study are also discussed.
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Chapter I.
Introduction

Interconnected computer networks have been the engine for economic growth and
innovation for the past few decades. It has become increasingly important to protect the
digital infrastructure of our society against attacks. The intrusion detection system (IDS),
has been widely used by individuals, business and organizations for their computer
networks protection.
Working with existing firewalls and anti-virus systems, an IDS is a device or
software application which monitors network traffic, identifies attacks by building
normal network profiles (anomaly-based IDS) or matching the patterns of malicious
behavior or violations (signature-based IDS) that protects computer networks against
attacks [34]. An IDS can offer real-time, cross-platform, and pre-host protection and is a
viable solution to mitigate some malicious attacks [13, 29]. Anomaly-based IDSs are
prone to having many false positives [32]. Signature-based IDSs are generally better with
the precision rate but can often miss attacks if the signature database is outdated or
incomplete [28, 33].
As cyber-attacks are becoming more sophisticated and being launched at a larger
scale and across platforms [cite examples], an intrusion detection system would be more
effective if it works with other IDSs. For example, IDS hosts can exchange resources
such as network traffic, data alerts, signatures and share signature databases. [7, 10, 23,
30, 31]. Such a system is referred as a collaborative intrusion detection system (CIDS).

Despite promising benefits of CIDS, the underlying trust behind sharing of resources
remains a major concern. In particular, an attacker host may join in a collaborative IDS
system network and provide inaccurate or malicious signatures. Moreover, a host
environment may be tampered with to alter the data files that actually store signature s
(Snort IDS saves the rules in plain text files, which can be easily altered).
Recently, there has been a spike of interest in the blockchain technology where
distributed data structure is shared and replicated among the participants in a peer-to-peer
network [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12]. The built-in immutability and consensus building make the
blockchain technology a viable solution to develop collaborative IDS and overcome trust
management and consensus building among IDS [26]. Alexopoulos et al. [23] proposed a
general framework for block-based collaborative IDS which is focused on using
blockchain for alert sharing and consensus building.
Inspired by the efforts of Alexopoulos et al.’s work, we introduce a blockchainenabled architecture for a signature-based IDS. In addition to alert exchange, we also
propose to use the blockchain technology for signature management such as signature
sharing, creation and verification among hosts in a CIDS. We also present the
implementation strategies of the architecture. Based on our knowledge, the proposed
architecture is the first kind for CIDSs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces related
work on Blockchain and intrusion detection systems, Section III discusses an architecture
for a collaborative Signature-based IDS based on the blockchain technology. Section IV
presents the implementation consideration of the proposed architecture. Finally, Section
V concludes the paper.
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Chapter II.
Background and Related Work

Blockchain can loosely be defined as a data structure, database, or a growing list
of records, called blocks, which are linked using cryptography [27]. There are three types
of blockchains: public, private and consortium [27].
A public blockchain such as Bitcoin is an open system [26] where anyone can join
and participate in the system. The two advantages of public blockchain are its
characteristics of Permission-less and immutability. Having a public blockchain removes
the necessity for a access control protocol. Applications can be added to the network
without approval, and blockchain becomes the transport layer of these applications [26].
A public blockchain is stored typically on a peer-to-peer network. This allows for the
data to be nigh unchangeable due to many computers storing the data and agreeing on
what is legitimate data and what could possibly be illegitimate.
A private blockchain is a closed system in which the use of the blockchain is
controlled. There is limited application of private blockchains as the central control
works against the decentralization aspect which is key to the blockchain concept.
In a consortium blockchain there is a mixture of both. Typically, a consortium is
public but the number of nodes who can change the data in the blocks is limited.
Consortium’s are sometimes invite-only for this purpose.
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Blockchain tends to fall short when it comes to scalability, depending on the
consensus algorithm used. Speed is a big concern as well for any application of a
blockchain system.

2.1 Consensus Algorithms
As a distributed structure, consensus building is very important for blockchain
where nodes of the blockchain construct and support the decision that works best for the
rest of them. It’s a form of resolution on how to add blocks, data, or do anything to the
blockchain. There are many consensus algorithms, however, this paper will only cover
those pertinent to the paper: Proof of Work, Proof of Stake, Delegated Proof of Stake,
Proof of Authority, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Proof of Elapsed Time.
Proof of work. In a proof of work system, the new blocks in the chain are created
by those that have the computational power to solve complex mathematical problems.
PoW has some problems with power consumption and inefficiency. This system is used
in Bitcoin and would not be ideal for the proposed IDS.

Proof of stake. In a proof of stake system, the new blocks are created in a
distributed consensus. The next block is chosen by combinations of random selection and
wealth range. Ethereum has a proof of stake currently in development called Casper.

Delegated Proof of Stake. In a delegated proof of stake, those that have ”stake” in
the blockchain can vote for others to have control of the chain. It isn’t all about who owns
11

the most cryptocurrency or most stake in the blocks, it is about having democratic votes
to mitigate the risks of the original proof of stake.

Proof of Authority (PoA). PoA consensus is built further off of Proof of Stake.
Instead of voting or allowing someone who was an early adopter of a blockchain to have
”stake” in it, the proof of authority puts the onus on those with the reputation to be in
control of the chain. These are trusted indiviudals within the community or network that
are well-respected.

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT). Named after an old adage of Byazanine
General problems, this algorithm has been around for some time. The idea is that two
generals were attempting to communicate between enemy lines and can never be 100%
sure that their messages are received. BFT at its simplest form is a way to avoid nodes or
blocks in the chain doing something that they were not supposed to do. BFT can be found
in many popular consensus algorithms in blockchain.

Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET). The PoET consensus algorithm that is designed to
be a production-grade protocol capable of supporting large network populations. PoET
algorithm relies on secure consensus without the power consumption drawbacks of the
Proof of Work algorithm. Each person in the network waits a random amount of time,
whoever finishes waiting first becomes the leader of the new block in the chain[25].

12

2.2 Blockchain Application

There are many different applications being conceived by researchers in the field
of blockchain, such as consensus algorithm research Proof of Majority[2], supply chains,
ProductChain, a scalable blockchain framework for supply chains[16], AutoBotCatcher a
system proposed to protect the infrastructure of IoT devices[4], TickEth, a proposed
system for using blockchain to buy sporting event tickets[22], a package delivery system
[14], and a networking trading system [17]. There is also work showing how blockchain
can be used with machine learning in [21] where the ledger self-adapts to transaction
demands. As we can see there is a body of work done on how blockchain can be used for
things other than cryptocurrencies.

2.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

There is a wealth of studies on Intrusion Detection System (IDS) because of its
impact on cybersecurity. IDSs can be categorized as host-based IDS and network-based
IDS. There are pros and cons for each type of IDS. In a host based system the IDS runs
on a single host, this allows for the IDS to directly monitor that host and which resources
were attacked. Host-based can make it difficult to analyze the intrusion attempts on
multiple computers and will be difficult to work in a large network environment. In a
13

network-based IDS a network sensor is installed on the network interface card and allows
for an entire network to be monitored. All of these packets are analyzed, however this can
take a lot of time and resources, and can miss packets going to a specific host.
IDSs can also be divided by the detection methods: signature-based intrusion
detection systems and anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. A signature-based IDS
relies on patterns of malicious behavior or violations to recognize the attacks. Signaturebased IDS could ideally identify 100% of the attacks with no false alarms as long as
signatures are specified ahead of time. However, each signature, even if it leads to the
same attack, has the potential to be unique from any other signatures. This is the most
commonly implemented IDS [34,35,36].
The other common type of IDS is an anomaly detection system. This type of IDS
focuses on the system’s normal behaviors instead of focusing on attack behaviors, as seen
with signature-based intrusion detection systems. To implement this type of IDS, the
approach is to use two phases. The first phase is the training phase where the systems
behavior is observed in the absence of any type of attack. Normal behavior for the system
is identified into a profile. After this, the second phase or detection phase, begins. In this
phase, the stored profile is compared to the way the system is currently behaving and
deviations from the profiles are considered potential attacks on the system. This can lead
to several false positives [37, 38, 39].
There has been a growing trend of research towards CIDS due to the speed and
efficiency of peer-to-peer networks[31][32]. As the Internet becomes faster the
shareability of an application becomes more likely. We are no longer bound to slower
speeds, or forced to store data locally, we can store and share data seamlessly among
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many networks. CIDS is a part of this evolution and is a major reason why we chose this
in our research. There are many other new ideas being conceived, such as the research
done on securing Internet of Things devices with a blockchain-based collaborative
IDS[5]. There is promise for CIDS to aid in securing intelligent electronic devices (IED)
with intrusion detection[10]. Kademlia (a peer-to-peer overlay) also shows proof of
concept with a CIDs-like system in [19].

2.4 Intersection of Blockchain and IDS

Given the built-in immutability and consensus building of blockchain technology,
researchers [23, 26] have started to apply blockchain technology to tackle issues in
Collaborative IDSs.
Meng et al. [26] conducted comprehensive survey on applicability of blockchain
technology in intrusion detection and identified several open challenges in the field. Such
as Latency, Complexity, Security, Privacy, and Limited Signature Coverage, among
others, our work can address these challenges by establishing a peer-to-peer network of
signatures, implementing security and trust policies via consensus building, and showing
that the speed of networks has increased to allow for blockchain and peer-to-peer
networks to succeed where in the past the limitations of network speeds was a limiting
factor. Alexopoulous et al. [23] proposed a system that uses blockchain technology for
trust building and alarm data exchange in CIDSs and discussed some design
considerations.
15

Chapter III.
The Proposed Architecture

Building on Alexopoulus et al. [23]’s work, we introduce a more comprehensive
architecture specifically for a signature-based CIDS. We argue that signature/rule
exchange and protection are a critical part of a CIDS and blockchain technology can be
used to facilitate rule exchange and secure the ruleset of each host IDS (hence we label
each IDS as blockchain-IDS).
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Figure. 1: Architecture of blockchain-based IDS
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Figure 1. Legend

As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed architecture applies consortium blockchain
infrastructure to build trust among participating IDS hosts and enable secure storage and
exchange of rule sets. Similarly, to a traditional IDS, there are three components inside of
a host in the proposed NIDS architecture: 1) a sniffer that reads and breaks down network
traffic and sends them to the detection engine; 2) a detection engine that compares the
packets received from the sniffer with rules/signature. 3) a rule manage that handles the
maintenance of the rules in a host and rule exchange with other hosts.
Each host IDS creates block to store its rule set and alarm data while in a
traditional IDS these rules are stored in ASCII format .txt files. Table 1 shows how an
IDS store rules in the blocks.

Genesis Block
Header
Rules

Previous Hash
Header
Added Rules

Previous Hash
Header
Added Rules

Block Hash

Block Hash

Block Hash

Figure. 2: Rule Storage in a Blockchain-based IDS
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In the proposed architecture, there are two types of host IDS: trusted nodes (T)
and participating nodes (P). All nodes can make a request to change the rule set such as
adding new rules, modifying or deleting existing rules. However, only trusted nodes are
involved in consensus building process which approve or reject the change request. The
rule change approval process is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 3: Consensus Building Process
Below is the general flow for adding a new rule to the system. The process for updating
or removing a rule is similar to rule addition.
1. T or P node makes an add-rule request
2. Notifications are sent to all T nodes on the network that a new request needs to be
voted on.
3. T nodes analyze the pending request and vote within a predesignated time frame.
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4. Votes are tallied automatically by the system and the request either is approved or
rejected.
5. Multiple requests can be voted on at once due to the blocks being immutable. The
approved requests are implemented in batch sequence.

Chapter IV.
Implementation

We built a preliminary prototype for the proposed architecture. The rule set is
adapted from Snort, an open-source, free and lightweight network intrusion detection
system (NIDS). In term of blockchain implementation, there are three popular options:
Ethereum Virtual Machine, Truffle Suite, HyperLedger.
Ethereum is best suited to cryptocurrency and would cost money to use the network.
Truffle Suite is only capable of development on the Ethereum network which would be
counterproductive to a prototype for this research paper[24][20] HyperLedger is an
umbrella project of open source blockchains and related tools, started in December 2015
by the Linux Foundation and supported by big industry players like IBM, Intel and SAP
to support the collaborative development of blockchain-based distributed ledgers [9].
There are many tools and frameworks available via HyperLedger. We want to have to an
open and consortium blockchain, hence the HyperLedger is a better choice to build our
prototype.
The HyperLedger Sawtooth or Fabric framework could work well for the
purposes of creating a blockchain-based IDS. The chaincode can initialize a ledger of
19

blockchain rules. We can then implement with javascript the following classes, this is not
an exhaustive list and can be added/remove as needed.
•

CreateRule- Creates a rule in the blockchain.

•

RemoveRule – Remove a rule from the blockchain.

•

QueryAllRules – This query will return all rules currently in the blockchain.

•

QueryRuleProperties – Will return the properties of a ruleID # such as
Port/Protocol/Owner/Etc

•

UpdateRuleProperties – Allow update to the properties of a rule if something
changes.

•

UpdateRuleOwner -Update the owner of a rule.

A snippet of the CreateRule function written in JavsScript for the HyperLedger
framework is listed as below.

async createRule(ctx, ruleNumber, RuleAction, protocol, sourceIP,
sourcePort, Direction, destIP, destPort, msg
sid, Revision, ClassType, Reference, RuleOwner) {
console.info('======== START : Create Rule ======');
const rule = {
RuleAction,
docType: 'rule',
protocol,
sourceIP,
sourcePort,
Direction,
destIP,
destPort,
msg,
sid,
Revision,
ClassType,
Reference,
20

RuleOwner,
};
Await ctx.stub.putState(ruleNumber, Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(rule)));
console.info('======= END : Create Rule ======');
}

These classes can be used to manipulate the blockchain from the backend. The
frontend instantiates the consensus algorithm and allow for the consortium to take place
on a larger scale.
Our prototype is built on a machine with following configurations: Intel Core i73630QM 2.4GHz with 6 MB L3 Cache, 8 GB DDR3 Memory, Dual NVIDIA GeForce
GT 650M SLI. Running LUbuntu 19.04.
Our prototype can be accessed from the Github repository,
https://github.com/delerak/bbids
The configuration used in our benchmark is known as a “simple” config included
with the Caliper framework. These config files define variables which are used during the
benchmark process. Some examples of the variables are txNumber, txDuration and
rateControl, these variables were left at default values for the tests that were run.
Once the benchmark test is run Caliper begins sending transactions to the
blockchain network. These transactions are simply communication packets being sent
between the network nodes and ensuring that the blockchain can function under network
stress. None of the blockchain data is altered during these tests.
The summary in Table. 2 shows several outputs. The name of the tests is
open/query these are simply labels that are used to differentiate testing variables that can
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be defined in the configuration file. We defined open as opening an account within the
system, and query for querying the blockchain for transactions. The transaction send rate
is how many transactions are being sent per second, the latency are based on the time it
takes for a transaction or query from the submission by the client until it is processed and
written on the ledger. Throughput is the number of transactions or queries per second
(TPS) that was processed by the blockchain network itself.

Table 1.
Benchmark tests of preliminary prototype.

Test Name Send Latency
Throughput
Rate Max Min Avg.
1
Open 50.3 78.16 1.26 42.43 10.3
2

Open 100.5 71.13 1.22 36.81 12.3

3

Open 149.5 74.63 1.08 38.10 12.3

4

Query 100.2 0.10

0.01 0.01

1002

5

Query 199.8 0.02

0.01 0.01

199.4

Note: 1) send rate and throughput are measured in transaction per seconds; 2) Latency is
measured in seconds.

4.1 Prototype Environment
The process by which I used to come to my results can be found here.
4.1.2 Hardware
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The hardware used during the testing process was a Lenovo IdeaPad Y500 with the
following specs:
•

3rd Generation Intel Core i7-3630QM Processor( 2.40GHz 6MB)

•

NVIDIA GeForce GT650M 2GB

•

8.0GB PC3-12800 DDR3 SDRAM 1600 MHz

•

1TB 5400 rpm

This is clearly an older model and has no special hardware or functionality.
Running the HyperLedger and Caliper on a newer hardware would likely increase
speed and response times.
4.1.3 Operating Systems
The OS used during this is Lubuntu 19.04, a lightweight version of Ubuntu which
requires less memory, space, and processor usage. The Linux OS was chosen due its
speed and efficiency of the system and the ease of usage within the scope of software
development and testing. Lubuntu was specifically chosen for its fast, lightweight, clean
and easy-to-use interface. A full Ubuntu install would work just as well with a faster
computer.
4.1.4 HyperLedger
HyperLedger (HL) has a significant amount of documentation, the complexity of
which cannot be understated. I will detail as best I can how I was able to get
HyperLedger running on my machine and include the necessary links to the HyperLedger
docs themselves.
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Firstly, HyperLedger is simply an umbrella term, what you will be installing and
building towards is one of the HL frameworks of which there are many. The two
frameworks used in my project are Fabric (for the blockchain) and Caliper (for the
benbchmark). Sawtooth is another option, however, Sawtooth was a much more complex
and confusing sort of blockchain. It should be noted that Sawtooth could conceptually
work as the blockchain but due to time constraints I decided that Fabric would be the best
option since it has a plug-n-play sort of setup, whereas Sawtooth is a customizable,
feature-rich framework which requires deep understanding of the setup.
4.1.5 Prerequisites
There are many prerequisites which can be timely to sort through. There is no easy way
to get these done, while some Linux distributions might already include these, it is very
likely that you will need to spend significant time simply setting up the environment so
that HyperLedger can work. I will state that there is a very concise and solid guide to do
this from the folks over at HyperLedger, I will include my own walkthrough, but I highly
recommend that the official site also be used. You can find the link below.
https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/prereqs.html

cURL
The curl tool is necessary for some installs and typically comes preconfigured on most
Linux distros. If you don’t have it download it here: https://curl.haxx.se/download.html

Docker and Docker Compose

24

Docker and Docker Compose are required for HyperLedger to run. This is one of the
most difficult steps in the process because Docker in and of itself is a complex concept to
grasp. I highly recommend that at least some familiarization with containerization and
Docker fundamentals is understood before moving any further. This link is very helpful
to begin: https://www.docker.com/resources/what-container
Docker documentation: https://docs.docker.com/
Once you have Docker installed and have some familiarity with it, I recommend going
thru the Docker tutorials completely and running containers and learning how the
network nodes will work, this will save you a lot of headaches once you get to installing
HyperLedger. Once you feel you have a firm grasp of Docker begin with the next steps of
the prerequisites.
Go Programming Language
The Go programming language is required for HyperLedger to run. Thankfully this step
is straightforward and simple, you just need to download the package and install it.

Node.js runtime and Node Package Manger (NPM)
Node.js and NPM are required to use HyperLedger. Node.js comes prepackaged with
NPM. One of the major problems you may run into with Node/NPM is the version usage.
You really should consider using NVM (node version manager) and then downgrading to
what is required to run HyperLedger. HyperLedger runs on 8.0x Node/NPM therefore
you cannot simply sudo apt-get npm sudo apt-get node and have it work. You need to
install NVM and then use NVM to install a specific version of npm/node and go from
there.
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Python
Python is needed to use node.js. Simply download and install Python on your linux
distro.

Fabric
Ah finally we get to install the blockchain software. Hopefully we don’t get any errors
but that is highly unlikely. The HyperLedger documentation should suffice from this
point on found at:
https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/install.html
There were many points where I had to debug and the best resources if an error is
encountered is to use Google and find StackOverflow results.

4.2 Prototype Guide
This section will be used to display the blockchains features such as rule_add,
rule_alter, change_owner functions. There are several steps that are outlined to describe
and show how the prototype works from start to finish. The prototype is a proof of
concept and would require more work to finish it completely. There will be a TODO
section at the end of the prototype guide to show what work would be useful to have done
to simplify the process and make it more robust.
Below you will find a flowchart detailing the steps necessary to get the prototype
up and running.
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4.2.1 Setting up Blockchain
Once the prerequisites are installed we begin by moving the BBIDS github code from
github.com/delerak/bbids, we can clone the repository from the command line.
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See
blockchain
output or
add_rule,
alter_rule
outputs

Step 1: Clone github repo. Make sure you are in the directory you need to be.

Figure. 4: Cloning the git repository
HyperLedger uses Go and your $GOPATH will probably be /home/go/src/github.com/*
I recommend cloning into that path and then working from there or else you will have
path errors for the rest of the setup.
Step 2:
Start the network with the startFabric script as seen below.
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Figure. 5: Starting the fabric blockchain network with javascript as the selected codebase
You will see output like the following:
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Figure. 6: Blockchain startup output

It could take some time to initialize the ledger of rules. This current iteration only has 50
IDS rules and took 115 seconds:

Figure 7: Blockchain startup script complete.
Step 3:
Now we must install the Node packages that are required by the HyperLedger. These
packages will install all required Node modules so that the code will run properly.
We do this with the command npm install from the /javascript folder.
If you run into any errors double check that you are using NPM 8.0 and not the latest
version of 12.4, HyperLedger only works with 8.0x.
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NVM:
Ensure you are using 8.0 or you will receive errors and will be unable to run the
HyperLedger framework.

Figure 8: Installing the node modules with npm.
Here is the output of the npm install:

Figure 9: NPM install output screenshot

Step 4: Enroll the users (trusted node and participating nodes).
The enrollAdmin and registerUser files are used to create the accounts used in the
querying and contract process. If these Node commands do not work, more than likely
you have a pathing problem with your $GOPATH and need to double-check that the code
is placed within /gopath/src/github.com/fabric-samples/fabcar
Enrolling the Trusted Node with enrollAdmin:
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Figure 10: Creating the “Trusted Node”
Enrolling the Participating Node with registerUser:

Figure 11: Creating the “Participating Node”
Step 5: Now that we have the network up and running and both the trusted and participant
nodes installed we can query the ledger and see our rules with the ‘Node Query’
command:
The Query command returns all the rules stored in the blockchain. It is currently
unformatted.
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Figure 12: IDS rules in Blockchain format.
Step 6: Adding a Rule, Altering a Rule, Querying a Specific Rule
At this point there are3 other functions available. Adding a rule, altering a rule, and
querying a specific rule. First we show adding, then altering, then querying a specific
rule. Note: Since everything is hardcoded you must change the source file in order to
make these queries as shown below.
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Adding a rule:

Edit invoke.js and go to the addRule function line.

Figure 13: Creating a rule within invoke.js
You can see I’m adding a rule with a couple of test fields and KSU in one. Next let’s find
the rule with the following command: node query | grep test
And it should highlight the new rules that were added:

Figure 14: Output of the created ‘test’ rule.
Alter Rule:
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We go into the source code for Invoke once more and call the function changeRuleOwner
from the fabcar.js ChainCode. See below:

Figure 15: Altering a rules ‘owner’ property.
Next, we run node invoke again.

Figure 16: Altering rule output.
Now we will try to find the new rule owner changed with node query | grep Dr.

Figure 17: Finding the new rule within the blockchain.
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As we can see from the screenshot the RuleOwner was switched to Dr. Lei Li.
Querying a specific rule:
To query a specific rule # we have to edit the query.js file directly as shown below:

Figure 18: Querying for a specific rule number.
Comment out the QueryAllRules function and write in the queryRule function:
As we can see the query now only returns RULE54 in the blockchain.

Figure 19: Output of the query for RULE54.
This concludes the walkthrough for the Blockchain Based IDS prototype.

4.3 YouTube Tutorial Videos
You can find my YouTube tutorial videos at the following playlist link.
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfobw40cSck2faRCNRK1inOt9mpF93R38
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Chapter V.
Conclusions

Collaborative IDS (CIDS) has been proposed to detect increasingly complex
cyber-attacks. Overcoming the issue of trust and sharing of rulesets has remained to a
challenge. In this paper, we proposed a CIDS architecture leveraging blockchain
technology’s record immutability and tamper proof properties of stored data in the
distributed ledger. We provided details on various workflows for our CIDS including
how to add or update rulesets. We implemented our prototype using HyperLedger
frameworks and evaluated using an available benchmark. The initial results look
promising, including running over 1000 transactions on the blockchain, latency numbers
were low and acceptable range for a small peer-to-peer network.
Our future work plan includes applying our prototype within a real network,
testing with simulated attack network traffics, and evaluating the performance with many
IDS nodes in place.
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Appendix I
BBids Prototype Code, using FabCar contract in HyperLedger

Chaincode files:

/lib/Fabcar.js
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
'use strict';
const { Contract } = require('fabric-contract-api');
class FabCar extends Contract {
async initLedger(ctx) {
console.info('============= START : Initialize Ledger
===========');
const rules = [
{
ruleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$HOME_NET',
sourcePort: '2589',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
destPort: 'any',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR - Dagger_1.4.0";
flow:to_client,established; content:"2|00 00 00 06 00 00 00|Drives|24
00|",depth 16',
sid: '105',
Revision: '14',
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ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'laufenberg',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '7597',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR QAZ Worm Client Login access";
flow:to_server,established; content:"qazwsx.hsq"',
sid: '108',
Revision: '11',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: 20034,
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR NetBus Pro 2.0 connection
established"; flow:to_client,established;
flowbits:isset,backdoor.netbus_2.connect; content:"BN|10 00 02 00 "',
sid: 115,
Revision: '15',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
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destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '7597',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR Infector.1.x";
flow:established,to_client; content:"WHATISIT",depth 9;
metadata:impact_flag red,ruleset community; reference:nessus,11157',
sid: '117',
Revision: '17',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$HOME_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
destPort: '666',
msg: "MALWARE-BACKDOOR SatansBackdoor.2.0.Beta";
flow:to_client,established; content:"Remote|3A| ",depth 11,nocase;
content:"You are connected to me.|0D 0A|Remote|3A| Ready for commands',
sid: '118',
Revision: '12',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: '12345',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: 12345,
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR netbus getinfo";
flow:to_server,established; content:"GetInfo|0D| "',
sid: '110',
Revision: '10',
ClassType: 'trojan-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
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RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$HOME_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
destPort: '6789',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR Doly 2.0 access";
flow:established,to_client; content:"Wtzup Use "',
sid: '119',
Revision: '11',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$HOME_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
destPort: '7597',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR Infector 1.6 Client to Server
Connection Request"; flow:to_server,established; content:"FC"',
sid: '121',
Revision: '14',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'nessus,1157',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: '31785',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: 'any',
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msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR HackAttack 1.20 Connect";
flow:established,to_client; content:"host"',
sid: '141',
Revision: '10',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '21',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-FTP ADMw0rm ftp login attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"USER",nocase; content:"w0rm",distance
1,nocase; pcre:"/^USER\s+w0rm/smi"',
sid: '144',
Revision: '16',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '666',
msg: '"MALWARE-BACKDOOR BackConstruction 2.1 Client FTP
Open Request"; flow:to_server,established; content:"FTPON "',
sid: '157',
Revision: '16',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
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protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '209',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '210',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '211',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
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Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '212',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '213',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
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msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '214',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR w00w00 attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"w00w00 "',
sid: '215',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR r00t attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:" r00t"',
sid: '216',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
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sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR rewt attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:" rewt"',
sid: '217',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:" wh00t"',
sid: '218',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR d13hh attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:" d13hh"',
sid: '219',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
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RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'tcp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$TELNET_SERVICES',
destPort: '23',
msg: 'MALWARE-BACKDOOR lrkr0x attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:" lrkr0x"',
sid: '220',
Revision: '19',
ClassType: 'attempted_admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '255',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'attempted-recon',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
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msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '256',
Revision: '12',
ClassType: 'attempted-admin',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'none',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '257',
Revision: '12',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '258',
Revision: '22',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
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{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '259',
Revision: '5',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '260',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
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msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '261',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '262',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '263',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
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{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '264',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '265',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
{
RuleAction: 'alert',
protocol: 'udp',
sourceIP: '$EXTERNAL_NET',
sourcePort: 'any',
Direction: '->',
destIP: '$HOME_NET',
destPort: '53',
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msg: 'PROTOCOL-DNS dns zone transfer via TCP detected";
flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 01 00 00 00 00 00|",depth 8,offset 6;
byte_test:1,!&,0xF8,4"',
sid: '266',
Revision: '23',
ClassType: 'misc-activity',
Reference: 'ruleset_community',
RuleOwner: 'mcafee,98775',
},
];
for (let i = 0; i < rules.length; i++) {
rules[i].docType = 'rule';
await ctx.stub.putState('RULE' + i,
Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(rules[i])));
console.info('Added <--> ', rules[i]);
}
console.info('============= END : Initialize Ledger
===========');
}
async queryRule(ctx, ruleNumber) {
const ruleAsBytes = await ctx.stub.getState(ruleNumber); // get the rule
from chaincode state
if (!ruleAsBytes || ruleAsBytes.length === 0) {
throw new Error(`${ruleNumber} does not exist`);
}
console.log(ruleAsBytes.toString());
return ruleAsBytes.toString();
}
async createRule(ctx, ruleNumber, RuleAction, protocol, sourceIP,
sourcePort, Direction, destIP, destPort, msg, sid, Revision, ClassType,
Reference, RuleOwner) {
console.info('============= START : Create Rule ===========');
const rule = {
RuleAction,
docType: 'rule',
sourceIP,
protocol,
sourcePort,
Direction,
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destIP,
destPort,
msg,
sid,
Revision,
ClassType,
Reference,
RuleOwner
};
await ctx.stub.putState(ruleNumber, Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(rule)));
console.info('============= END : Create Rule ===========');
}
async queryAllRules(ctx) {
const startKey = 'RULE0';
const endKey = 'RULE999';
const iterator = await ctx.stub.getStateByRange(startKey, endKey);
const allResults = [];
while (true) {
const res = await iterator.next();
if (res.value && res.value.value.toString()) {
console.log(res.value.value.toString('utf8'));
const Key = res.value.'{print $3}'key;
let Record;
try {
Record = JSON.parse(res.value.value.toString('utf8'));
} catch (err) {
console.log(err);
Record = res.value.value.toString('utf8');
}
allResults.push({ Key, Record });
}
if (res.done) {
console.log('end of data');
await iterator.close();
console.info(allResults);
return JSON.stringify(allResults);
}
53

}
}
async changeRuleOwner(ctx, ruleNumber, newOwner) {
console.info('============= START : changeOwner
===========');
const ruleAsBytes = await ctx.stub.getState(ruleNumber); // get the rule
from chaincode state
if (!ruleAsBytes || ruleAsBytes.length === 0) {
throw new Error(`${ruleNumber} does not exist`);
}
const rule = JSON.parse(ruleAsBytes.toString());
rule.RuleOwner = newOwner;
await ctx.stub.putState(ruleNumber, Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(rule)));
console.info('============= END : changeOwner ===========');
}
}
module.exports = FabCar;

Startup Script:
#!/bi
n/ba
sh
#
# Copyright IBM Corp All Rights Reserved
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Exit on first error
set -e
# don't rewrite paths for Windows Git Bash users
export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1
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starttime=$(date +%s)
CC_SRC_LANGUAGE=${1:-"go"}
CC_SRC_LANGUAGE=`echo "$CC_SRC_LANGUAGE" | tr [:upper:]
[:lower:]`
if [ "$CC_SRC_LANGUAGE" = "go" -o "$CC_SRC_LANGUAGE" =
"golang" ]; then
CC_RUNTIME_LANGUAGE=golang
CC_SRC_PATH=github.com/fabcar/go
elif [ "$CC_SRC_LANGUAGE" = "javascript" ]; then
CC_RUNTIME_LANGUAGE=node # chaincode runtime language is
node.js
CC_SRC_PATH=/opt/gopath/src/github.com/fabcar/javascript
elif [ "$CC_SRC_LANGUAGE" = "typescript" ]; then
CC_RUNTIME_LANGUAGE=node # chaincode runtime language is
node.js
CC_SRC_PATH=/opt/gopath/src/github.com/fabcar/typescript
echo Compiling TypeScript code into JavaScript ...
pushd ../chaincode/fabcar/typescript
npm install
npm run build
popd
echo Finished compiling TypeScript code into JavaScript
else
echo The chaincode language ${CC_SRC_LANGUAGE} is not
supported by this script
echo Supported chaincode languages are: go, javascript, and typescript
exit 1
fi

# clean the keystore
rm -rf ./hfc-key-store
# launch network; create channel and join peer to channel
cd ../basic-network
./start.sh
# Now launch the CLI container in order to install, instantiate chaincode
# and prime the ledger with our 50 rules
docker-compose -f ./docker-compose.yml up -d cli
docker ps -a
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docker exec -e "CORE_PEER_LOCALMSPID=Org1MSP" -e
"CORE_PEER_MSPCONFIGPATH=/opt/gopath/src/github.com/hyperledger
/fabric/peer/crypto/peerOrganizations/org1.example.com/users/Admin@org1.
example.com/msp" cli peer chaincode install -n fabcar -v 1.0 -p
"$CC_SRC_PATH" -l "$CC_RUNTIME_LANGUAGE"
docker exec -e "CORE_PEER_LOCALMSPID=Org1MSP" -e
"CORE_PEER_MSPCONFIGPATH=/opt/gopath/src/github.com/hyperledger
/fabric/peer/crypto/peerOrganizations/org1.example.com/users/Admin@org1.
example.com/msp" cli peer chaincode instantiate -o
orderer.example.com:7050 -C mychannel -n fabcar -l
"$CC_RUNTIME_LANGUAGE" -v 1.0 -c '{"Args":[]}' -P "OR
('Org1MSP.member','Org2MSP.member')"
sleep 10
docker exec -e "CORE_PEER_LOCALMSPID=Org1MSP" -e
"CORE_PEER_MSPCONFIGPATH=/opt/gopath/src/github.com/hyperledger
/fabric/peer/crypto/peerOrganizations/org1.example.com/users/Admin@org1.
example.com/msp" cli peer chaincode invoke -o orderer.example.com:7050 C mychannel -n fabcar -c '{"function":"initLedger","Args":[]}'
cat <<EOF
Total setup execution time : $(($(date +%s) - starttime)) secs ...
Next, use the BBIDS applications to interact with the deployed BBIDS
contract.
Start by changing into the "javascript" directory:
cd javascript
Next, install all required packages:
npm install
Then run the following applications to enroll the admin user, and register a
new user
called user1 which will be used by the other applications to interact with the
deployed
BBIDS contract:
node enrollAdmin - this is considered the Trusted Node in the BBIDS
Architecture
node registerUser - this is considered a Participating Node in the BBIDS
Architecture
You can run the invoke application as follows. By default, the invoke
application will
create a new rule, but you can update the application to submit other
transactions:
node invoke
You can run the query application as follows. By default, the query
application will
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return all rules, but you can update the application to evaluate other
transactions:
node query
NOTE: Currently everything is hardcoded so you must go into the
query/invoke JavaScript
files in order to adjust their queries or invocations.
EOF

Contract files:
enrollAdmin.js
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
'use strict';
const FabricCAServices = require('fabric-ca-client');
const { FileSystemWallet, X509WalletMixin } = require('fabric-network');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const ccpPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'basic-network',
'connection.json');
const ccpJSON = fs.readFileSync(ccpPath, 'utf8');
const ccp = JSON.parse(ccpJSON);
async function main() {
try {
// Create a new CA client for interacting with the CA.
const caURL = ccp.certificateAuthorities['ca.example.com'].url;
const ca = new FabricCAServices(caURL);
// Create a new file system based wallet for managing identities.
const walletPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'wallet');
const wallet = new FileSystemWallet(walletPath);
console.log(`Wallet path: ${walletPath}`);
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// Check to see if we've already enrolled the admin user.
const adminExists = await wallet.exists('admin');
if (adminExists) {
console.log('An identity for the admin user "admin" already exists in
the wallet');
return;
}
// Enroll the admin user, and import the new identity into the wallet.
const enrollment = await ca.enroll({ enrollmentID: 'admin',
enrollmentSecret: 'adminpw' });
const identity = X509WalletMixin.createIdentity('Org1MSP',
enrollment.certificate, enrollment.key.toBytes());
wallet.import('admin', identity);
console.log('Successfully enrolled admin user "admin" and imported it
into the wallet');
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to enroll admin user "admin": ${error}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
main();

Invoke.js
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
'use strict';
const { FileSystemWallet, Gateway } = require('fabric-network');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const ccpPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'basic-network',
'connection.json');
const ccpJSON = fs.readFileSync(ccpPath, 'utf8');
const ccp = JSON.parse(ccpJSON);
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async function main() {
try {
// Create a new file system based wallet for managing identities.
const walletPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'wallet');
const wallet = new FileSystemWallet(walletPath);
console.log(`Wallet path: ${walletPath}`);
// Check to see if we've already enrolled the user.
const userExists = await wallet.exists('user1');
if (!userExists) {
console.log('An identity for the user "user1" does not exist in the
wallet');
console.log('Run the registerUser.js application before retrying');
return;
}
// Create a new gateway for connecting to our peer node.
const gateway = new Gateway();
await gateway.connect(ccp, { wallet, identity: 'user1', discovery: {
enabled: false } });
// Get the network (channel) our contract is deployed to.
const network = await gateway.getNetwork('mychannel');
// Get the contract from the network.
const contract = network.getContract('fabcar');
// Submit the specified transaction.
// createRule transaction - requires 5 argument, ex: ('createRule',
'RULE12', 'alert', 'tcp', 'source-port', 'source-ip')
// changeRuleOwner transaction - requires 2 args , ex: ('Rule', 'RULE10',
'Daniel')
await contract.submitTransaction('createRule', 'RULE53', 'Dr. Shahriar',
'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test', 'test');
console.log('Transaction has been submitted');
// Disconnect from the gateway.
await gateway.disconnect();
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to submit transaction: ${error}`);
process.exit(1);
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}
}
main();

Query.js
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
'use strict';
const { FileSystemWallet, Gateway } = require('fabric-network');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const ccpPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'basic-network',
'connection.json');
const ccpJSON = fs.readFileSync(ccpPath, 'utf8');
const ccp = JSON.parse(ccpJSON);
async function main() {
try {
// Create a new file system based wallet for managing identities.
const walletPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'wallet');
const wallet = new FileSystemWallet(walletPath);
console.log(`Wallet path: ${walletPath}`);
// Check to see if we've already enrolled the user.
const userExists = await wallet.exists('user1');
if (!userExists) {
console.log('An identity for the user "user1" does not exist in the
wallet');
console.log('Run the registerUser.js application before retrying');
return;
}
// Create a new gateway for connecting to our peer node.
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const gateway = new Gateway();
await gateway.connect(ccp, { wallet, identity: 'user1', discovery: {
enabled: false } });
// Get the network (channel) our contract is deployed to.
const network = await gateway.getNetwork('mychannel');
// Get the contract from the network.
const contract = network.getContract('fabcar');
// Evaluate the specified transaction.
// queryRule transaction - requires 1 argument, ex: ('queryRule', 'RULE4')
// queryAllRules transaction - requires no arguments, ex:
('queryAllRules')
const result = await contract.evaluateTransaction('queryAllRules');
console.log(`Transaction has been evaluated, result is:
${result.toString()}`);
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to evaluate transaction: ${error}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
main();

registerUser.js
/*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
'use strict';
const { FileSystemWallet, Gateway, X509WalletMixin } = require('fabricnetwork');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
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const ccpPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', 'basic-network',
'connection.json');
const ccpJSON = fs.readFileSync(ccpPath, 'utf8');
const ccp = JSON.parse(ccpJSON);
async function main() {
try {
// Create a new file system based wallet for managing identities.
const walletPath = path.join(process.cwd(), 'wallet');
const wallet = new FileSystemWallet(walletPath);
console.log(`Wallet path: ${walletPath}`);
// Check to see if we've already enrolled the user.
const userExists = await wallet.exists('user1');
if (userExists) {
console.log('An identity for the user "user1" already exists in the
wallet');
return;
}
// Check to see if we've already enrolled the admin user.
const adminExists = await wallet.exists('admin');
if (!adminExists) {
console.log('An identity for the admin user "admin" does not exist in
the wallet');
console.log('Run the enrollAdmin.js application before retrying');
return;
}
// Create a new gateway for connecting to our peer node.
const gateway = new Gateway();
await gateway.connect(ccp, { wallet, identity: 'admin', discovery: {
enabled: false } });
// Get the CA client object from the gateway for interacting with the CA.
const ca = gateway.getClient().getCertificateAuthority();
const adminIdentity = gateway.getCurrentIdentity();
// Register the user, enroll the user, and import the new identity into the
wallet.
const secret = await ca.register({ affiliation: 'org1.department1',
enrollmentID: 'user1', role: 'client' }, adminIdentity);
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const enrollment = await ca.enroll({ enrollmentID: 'user1',
enrollmentSecret: secret });
const userIdentity = X509WalletMixin.createIdentity('Org1MSP',
enrollment.certificate, enrollment.key.toBytes());
wallet.import('user1', userIdentity);
console.log('Successfully registered and enrolled admin user "user1" and
imported it into the wallet');
} catch (error) {
console.error(`Failed to register user "user1": ${error}`);
process.exit(1);
}
}
main();
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